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HOW SHOULD WE LICENSE LAWYERS?
Cassandra Burke Robertson*
INTRODUCTION
During the summer of 2020, anger and frustration about lawyer licensing
practices boiled over.1 The bar exam had always imposed economic and
psychological burdens on test takers, but the rise of a pandemic added an
additional hazard: exposure to a dangerous virus. Some states continued the
in-person traditional exam despite the health risks, but others experimented
with different licensing options, including online proctored exams, online
take-home exams, supervised practice, and even diploma privilege.2
Examinees struggled to keep up with states’ late-changing requirements, and
technological glitches added yet another degree of difficulty.3
The conversations—and frustrations—arising from states’ shifting exam
policies laid bare the lack of a coherent rationale for this traditional entry
* John Deaver Drinko–BakerHostetler Professor of Law and Director of the Center for
Professional Ethics at Case Western Reserve University School of Law. This Article was
prepared for the Colloquium entitled The Judicial Role in Professional Regulation, hosted by
the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics on October, 9, 2020, at
Fordham University School of Law. Many thanks to Bruce A. Green, the participants at the.
Colloquium, and the editors of the Fordham Law Review for their thoughtful suggestions.
1. Valerie Strauss, Why This Pandemic Is a Good Time to Stop Forcing Prospective
Lawyers to Take Bar Exams, WASH. POST (July 13, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
education/2020/07/13/why-this-pandemic-is-good-time-stop-forcing-prospective-lawyerstake-bar-exams [https://perma.cc/WUE8-XF57]. See generally Claudia Angelos et al., The
Bar Exam and the COVID-19 Pandemic: The Need for Immediate Action (Ohio State Univ.
Moritz Coll. of L., Legal Stud. Working Paper No. 537, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3559060 [https://perma.cc/9MVZ-6WZA] (outlining options for
licensing in lieu of an in-person exam).
2. Bar Exam Modifications During COVID-19: 50-State Resources, JUSTIA (Jan. 2021),
https://www.justia.com/covid-19/50-state-covid-19-resources/bar-exam-modificationsduring-covid-19-50-state-resources [https://perma.cc/6NCX-GNUE].
3. DP4A Co-founders Speak on Diploma Privilege and the Future of the Bar Exam,
UNITED FOR DIPLOMA PRIVILEGE (July 13, 2020), http://www.unitedfordiplomaprivilege.org/
2020/07/13/dp4a-co-founders-speak-on-diploma-privilege-and-the-future-of-the-bar-exam
[https://perma.cc/Z865-G8F2]. Diploma privilege allows new lawyers to be admitted to
practice in a state upon graduation from a qualifying program of legal education. See Beverly
Moran, The Wisconsin Diploma Privilege: Try It, You’ll Like It, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 645, 646
(explaining that during the “heyday” of diploma privilege, “practices fell into three general
categories: (1) universal diploma privilege, in which the state admitted anyone who had a
diploma from any U.S. law school; (2) statewide diploma privilege, in which a graduate of
any school within the state was admitted to practice in that state; and (3) state university
diploma privilege, in which only graduates of the state’s law school were permitted to practice
without further examination”).
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point into the legal profession. The costs of the bar exam are heavy.4 The
test is expensive for states to administer and it also poses a significant hurdle
for recent graduates, who generally must find the time and money to study
for months before they can obtain or begin full-time work.5 Applicants
without financial resources face significant disadvantages, often struggling
to support themselves while they study.6 The bar exam also carries with it a
troubling history of racial and economic exclusionism that the states have
never adequately addressed.7
Nor do any significant benefits offset the heavy costs of requiring
applicants to pass the bar exam.8 The skills that the bar exam tests—largely
memorization and regurgitation of esoteric legal rules—bear little
resemblance to the daily work of lawyers, regardless of the practice setting.9
The law tested on the exam is sometimes so narrowly state specific that it is
of limited utility in law practices that increasingly span state and even
national borders.10 States moving toward bar exam uniformity overcome that
hurdle but create a new problem: the “law” they test may be based on general
principles that are not actually the governing law of any particular
jurisdiction.11 Given these weaknesses, it is unsurprising to see mounting
evidence that the bar exam offers little predictive value about lawyers’
abilities to serve their future clients.12
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. See infra Part II.A. For example, in Texas these administrative costs are funded solely
by licensing fees. In 2015, a report from the Texas Board of Law Examiners stated that the
agency spent over $1.7 million a year to administer the bar exam, separate and apart from the
costs of general agency administration and character and fitness review. TEX. BD. OF L.
EXAM’RS, SELF-EVALUATION REPORT TO THE SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION 20 (2015),
https://www.sunset.texas.gov/public/uploads/files/reports/Law%20Examiners%20Self%20E
valuation%20Report_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/WKA9-6769].
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. See infra Part II.C.
9. See Andrea A. Curcio et al., How to Build a Better Bar Exam, N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N J.,
Sept. 2018, at 37, 38 (criticizing the bar exam’s reliance on the “unproductive memorization
of so many detailed rules of law”); Joan W. Howarth & Judith Welch Wegner, Ringing
Changes: Systems Thinking About Legal Licensing, 13 FIU L. REV. 383, 456 (2019) (“Law
professors typically advise students not to rely on memorization, but rather to always check
current case-law, statutory, and regulatory requirements in order to serve their clients
competently. Bar exams fail to recognize this basic principle of lawyer competence and
instead ask applicants to rely on their memories to address the range of subjects and questions
posed.”).
10. See Austen L. Parrish, Dean’s Perspective: The Bar Exam, RES GESTAE (Ind. State
Bar Ass’n, Indianapolis, Ind.), Apr. 2020, at 10, 19 (recommending that Indiana adopt the
Uniform Bar Examination in order to eliminate artificial barriers discouraging lawyers’ and
law students’ entry into the state and arguing that bar exams are not a good way to “learn the
intricacies of local law”).
11. See Dennis R. Honabach, To UBE or Not to UBE: Reconsidering the Uniform Bar
Exam, 22 PRO. LAW., no. 2, 2014, at 43, 47 (explaining that “the ‘correct answer’ to a question
may require a candidate to apply legal doctrine that is not the law and may have never been
the law in the state in which the candidate is sitting for the bar examination”).
12. See Joan W. Howarth, The Professional Responsibility Case for Valid and
Nondiscriminatory Bar Exams, 33 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 931, 933 (2020) (“[S]erious criticism
of bar exams on both grounds—questionable validity and racially disproportionate impact—
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One day, the pandemic will end. When it does, we should build on the
momentum arising out of the frustrations relating to the bar exam to create a
more effective licensing system. Small changes to the format or subjects
covered on the bar exam do not go far enough.13 Creating a licensing regime
focused on protecting clients requires reevaluating licensing from the ground
up and abandoning the idea of one-size-fits-all licensing practices.
What would a licensing regime designed around client protection look
like? This Article proposes that it would include a narrower but more active
judicial role. A one-size-fits-all exam would no longer control entry into the
profession. The state judiciary would not be the gatekeeper for the entire
legal profession; instead, its licensing role would focus on those attorneys
who represent individual clients in court and those who manage client funds.
But for this subset of lawyers, state judges should take a larger and more
active role in overseeing the transition from student to advocate and should
require greater practice readiness that goes beyond mere entry-level
minimum competence.
The legal profession has the capability to adopt licensing programs that
vary by practice area and setting, create less of a burden on recent graduates,
and do a better job of protecting the most vulnerable clients. We should move
to a system of specialized licenses that better reflect the diversity of twentyfirst-century law practice.
I. THE HISTORY OF LAWYER LICENSING
Both judicial authority over admission to the practice of law and judicial
examination of entry-level competence date back well over a century. In the
early days of the United States, both legal education and lawyer licensing
were far less formalized. State legislators determined the general
qualifications to practice law, and the courts themselves decided whether to
admit individuals practicing before them.14 This practice started to change
in the late nineteenth century, as “state supreme courts began to claim an
inherent judicial authority to regulate the practice of law as an outgrowth of
the constitutional separation of powers between the legislative and judicial
is widespread and persistent.”); Deborah Jones Merritt, Validity, Competence, and the Bar
Exam, AALS NEWS (Ass’n of Am. L. Schs., Washington, D.C.), Spring 2017, at 11, 11,
https://www.aals.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/AALSnews_spring17-v9.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9RJ8-EHUR] (“[G]rowing evidence suggests that our exam is invalid: the
knowledge and skills tested by the exam vary too greatly from the ones clients require from
their lawyers.”).
13. See, e.g., Diksha Jain, NCBE Approves Task Force’s Recommendation, Major
Changes to Be Introduced to the Bar Exam, JD J. (Jan. 30, 2021),
https://www.jdjournal.com/2021/01/30/ncbe-approves-task-forces-recommendations-majorchanges-to-be-introduced-to-the-bar-exam [https://perma.cc/66U5-28AX] (noting that
proposed changes to the Uniform Bar Exam would include greater testing of “foundational
skills” but would remain “a single-event, summative exam. . . . conducted at or near the

point of licensure”).

14. Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should
Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1172
(2003).
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branches.”15 The state high courts consolidated authority to both determine
the theoretical qualifications for practice and admit individuals into the
practice of law.
A. The Origin of Judicial Power to Determine Competency
An early dispute in Illinois highlighted this shift. In 1897, the Illinois
Supreme Court passed a rule requiring three years of law study (rather than
the usual two) and further required passage of a bar exam before admission
to practice.16 Controversially, the court applied these requirements even to
law students who had already started their studies and expected to practice
immediately upon completion of their two years of study.17
The affected students lobbied the Illinois legislature for an exemption18
and set off something of a power struggle between the branches of
government. The legislature passed a resolution in early 1898, which
expressed the legislature’s view that the requirement should be imposed only
on students who began their studies after the adoption of the heightened
requirements.19 When the court “remained obdurate”20 on the requirement,
noting that it had adopted the new standard to protect the public and not the
students, the legislature then passed a law providing that any applicants who
began their studies when the former requirements were in place “shall be
admitted” to practice.21
Ultimately, however, the judiciary won the power struggle in Illinois.
When the graduates applied for admission to the bar based on their two-year
diploma, the Illinois Supreme Court denied their admission on constitutional
grounds.22 The court held that “the legislature, in its enactment, overlooked
the restraint imposed by the constitution and assumed the exercise of a power
properly belonging to the courts.”23 Two judges dissented and explained that
under their view, the legislature’s action to set qualifications for attorneys
“as a class” was a valid exercise of its police power that neither infringed on
judicial power nor usurped it.24 That view, however, did not prevail. One of
the attorneys who had argued against the applicants’ admission later
summarized the court’s action in a law review article, writing that “[i]n the
United States courts . . . the act of admission is judicial. Since attorneys are
officers and members of the courts, the Legislature cannot deprive the courts
of discretion as to whom they shall admit.”25
15. Id. at 1173.
16. Blewett Lee, The Constitutional Power of the Courts over Admission to the Bar, 13
HARV. L. REV. 233, 233 (1899).
17. Id. at 233.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 234.
21. Id. at 235.
22. See generally In re Day, 54 N.E. 646 (Ill. 1899).
23. Id. at 648.
24. Id. at 657 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
25. Lee, supra note 16, at 240.
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B. Protectionist and Exclusionary Practices
Although tension remained between the judicial and legislative powers to
regulate the practice of law, state judicial branches took a primary role in
determining how to license lawyers. Overseeing bar admission, however,
was a major undertaking. As a result, the state supreme courts largely
delegated this work to bar associations or similar entities composed of
attorneys.26 This, in turn, prompted two significant developments.
First, the attorneys exercising this power defined the practice of law very
broadly to include activities that extended well beyond the judicial sphere
and “stretch[ed] to incorporate effectively everything done by lawyers: legal
advice, drafting, negotiation, representation, and support in dispute
resolution processes.”27 Second, the bar associations often applied a view of
“sheer protectionism” in adopting licensing regulations.28 The protectionist
impulse was part of a national trend, as states began adopting occupational
licensing for many professions at that time. Between 1880 and 1930, states
implemented licensing requirements for “architects, attorneys, barbers,
beauticians, dentists, engineers, nurses, physicians, plumbers, teachers, and
veterinarians.”29
When states adopted more stringent regulations for entry into the
profession during the early part of the twentieth century, they applied an
overtly exclusionary rationale that discriminated on both racial and
socioeconomic grounds.30 At that time, the country was undergoing a period
of significant immigration, with more people coming from eastern and
southern Europe, in contrast to prior waves from western and northern
Europe.31 The “upper bar,” largely consisting of better-off white men,
resented the activities of the “entrepreneurial bar” made up of “immigrants
and minorities that had to struggle for business.”32 Raising barriers to entry
was part of “an implied (and sometimes blatant) effort to bar immigrants,
Jews, and blacks from joining the profession.”33

26. Gillian K. Hadfield & Deborah L. Rhode, How to Regulate Legal Services to Promote
Access, Innovation, and the Quality of Lawyering, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1204 (2016).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1194; see also Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 61 (1981).
29. Marc T. Law & Sukko Kim, Specialization and Regulation: The Rise of Professionals
and the Emergence of Occupational Licensing Regulation, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 723, 732 (2005).
30. Barton, supra note 14, at 1194–95.
31. See, e.g., Jagdeep S. Bhandari, International Migration and Trade: A Multidisciplinary Synthesis, 6 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 113, 137 n.76 (2006) (“The literacy test
requirement (passed by Congress in 1917, over President Wilson’s veto) was meant to slow
down immigration form [sic] Eastern and Southern Europe.”); Stephen M. Feldman, Missing
the Point of the Past (and the Present) of Free Expression, 89 TEMP. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 60
(2017) (explaining that by the late nineteenth century, “a large percentage of immigrants
[were] coming from eastern and southern Europe (rather than from western and northern
Europe, as in the past)”).
32. Barton, supra note 14, at 1194.
33. Id.
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Bar leaders worked through institutions to limit admission to practice. The
American Bar Association (ABA) and the Association of American Law
Schools “stood arm-in-arm against their common enemy: night law schools
and the immigrants who crowded into them.”34 They worked together to
push for more stringent educational requirements:
The inferior quality of the bar was blamed upon easy access; the denial of
justice to the poor, in turn, was blamed upon an inferior bar. To elitists, in
practice or in the professoriat, the remedy was obvious: the quality of the
bar and the quality of legal services would improve only if professional
access was restricted.35

In 1931, the National Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBE) was created
with a “founding purpose” to protect against the “overcrowding” of the bar.36
Those pushing for higher hurdles to admission did not see any conflict
between improving the quality of professional services and increasing the
exclusivity of the profession. In their view, restricting entry into the
profession to those already in positions of privilege necessarily improved the
quality of services offered.37
Some states were up front about their exclusionary goals in adopting
examination requirements. South Carolina, for example, allowed for
diploma privilege for the first half of the twentieth century.38 But when
Black students began to graduate from law schools, the state adopted a bar
exam requirement that a South Carolina lawmaker expressly stated was
intended to “bar Negroes and some undesirable whites” from the practice of
law.39 Much like the “literacy tests” adopted to restrict voting rights,40 the
exam served its purpose: from 1950 to 1973, “only 15 percent of the African
Americans passed the bar exam in South Carolina, compared to 90 percent
of the whites.”41 Mississippi followed a similar pattern and, after allowing
diploma privilege until 1960, required examination in later years.42
The exclusionary trend was a national problem not limited to the southern
states. In 1912, the ABA admitted three new members without realizing they
were Black. One of the three, William Lewis, was then an assistant attorney

34. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 110 (1977).
35. Id. at 116.
36. Michael Ariens, The NCBE’s Wrong-Headed Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic
1 (Apr. 28, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3587751
[https://perma.cc/LY5R-7ZTH]; see also Editorial, 1 BAR EXAM’R 211, 211 (1932) (“The
present situation emphasizes the overcrowded condition of the bar.”).
37. AUERBACH, supra note 34, at 110 (explaining that the connection between quality and
exclusivity appeared obvious to those in favor of increased licensing restrictions).
38. R. Scott Baker, The Paradoxes of Desegregation: Race, Class, and Education, 1935–
1975, 109 AM. J. EDUC. 320, 331 (2001).
39. Id.
40. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 132 (1970) (“In enacting the literacy test ban
of Title II Congress had before it a long history of the discriminatory use of literacy tests to
disfranchise voters on account of their race.”).
41. Baker, supra note 38, at 331.
42. Id.
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general of the United States and a graduate of Harvard Law School.43 When
the ABA leadership learned that “[t]hree persons of the colored race were
elected to membership in this Association without knowledge upon the part
of those electing them that they were of that race,” it passed a resolution
providing that “it has never been contemplated that members of the colored
race should become members of this Association.”44 Two years later, the
ABA toned down that resolution to avoid “disturb[ing] the pleasant relations
that have hitherto existed” in the organization.45 It eliminated the explicit
racial restriction and instead required that all nominations for membership be
accompanied by a notation of the applicant’s race and sex.46 The revised
resolution may have appeared more genteel by no longer “saying the quiet
part loud,”47 but the effect was the same: it would be nearly four more
decades before the organization would admit another Black lawyer.48
II. THE UNEVEN COSTS AND BENEFITS OF LAWYER LICENSING
State supreme courts continue to exercise the power to determine the
requirements for entry into the legal profession. Today, the defense of entry
requirements, including the bar exam, rests on a public protection argument:
that the bar exam is needed to ensure that lawyers meet a standard of
minimum competence to protect clients from incompetent or unethical
practices.49 The states and bar associations have affirmatively disavowed the
racist and exclusionary practices of the past. The ABA and the Association
of American Law Schools have explicitly adopted diversity and inclusion in
the legal profession as key values, and state licensing entities have also
enacted programs to increase pathways for lawyers from underrepresented
groups.50 Nevertheless, the effects of earlier exclusionary polices remain.
Even today, the NCBE admits that “differences in average performance on
the bar exam tend to be observed across racial/ethnic groups,” though it

43. John Payton, Democracy and Diversity, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 569, 570 (2008) (“[I]t did
not occur to the ABA that a Harvard Law graduate could be a Black person.”).
44. Resolution on Status of Certain Members, 35 A.B.A. REP. 12, 12–13 (1912).
45. Proceedings of American Bar Association, 37 A.B.A. REP. 5, 62 (1914).
46. Id.; see also Payton, supra note 43, at 571.
47. Clare C. H., A New ‘Simpson-ism’ for the Trump Era, MEDIUM (Aug. 10, 2020),
https://medium.com/fan-fare/a-new-simpson-ism-for-the-trump-era-c0dbf929223b
[https://perma.cc/3YNP-Z5BT].
48. ABA
Timeline,
AM.
BAR
ASS’N.,
https://www.americanbar.org/
about_the_aba/timeline [https://perma.cc/FZE4-W2R7] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (noting
that it would not be until 1950 that the organization admitted another Black lawyer).
49. Robert Anderson IV & Derek T. Muller, The High Cost of Lowering the Bar, 32 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 307, 307 (2019) (“We present data suggesting that lowering the bar exam
passing score will likely increase the amount of malpractice, misconduct, and discipline
among lawyers.”).
50. See
ABA
Mission
&
Goals,
AM.
BAR
ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba/aba-mission-goals
[https://perma.cc/7Z9LKE7W] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021); Membership & Core Values, ASS’N OF AM L. SCHS.,
https://www.aals.org/about/membership [https://perma.cc/WZ6M-CUMS] (last visited Jan.
27, 2021).
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attributes these differences to the educational pipeline at earlier stages, rather
than to the exam itself.51
The bar exam has improved over time. In recent years, the states have
taken some steps to better align bar entry requirements with the needs of a
practicing lawyer. States have attempted to make the bar exam better reflect
actual practice readiness, especially by adding a performance test that focuses
on the skills of legal analysis and writing.52 And after facing lawsuits from
both the federal government and from applicants to the bar, the states have
also narrowed the character and fitness process to focus more closely on
matters tied to client representation.53
Even with these changes, the modern path into the legal profession still
looks like the path carved out by the midcentury reformers who sought to
erect barriers to entry. In most states, lawyer licensing carries three primary
requirements: graduation from law school (in most states, from a school
accredited by the ABA), demonstrating character and fitness suitable for the
legal profession, and passing a multiday bar exam that covers a variety of
legal subjects and relies heavily on memorization.54 Weighing the costs and
benefits of current-day licensing regimes requires examining the publicprotection benefits of lawyer licensing in light of the exclusionary hurdles
they pose to entrants and the administrative costs they create for states.
51. NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAM’RS, BAR ADMISSIONS DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC:
EVALUATING OPTIONS FOR THE CLASS OF 2020, at 1, 6 (2020), https://www.ncbex.org/
pdfviewer/?file=%2Fdmsdocument%2F239 [https://perma.cc/QXK6-5ADQ].
52. Sabrina DeFabritiis & Kathleen Elliott Vinson, Under Pressure: How Incorporating
Time-Pressured Performance Tests Prepares Students for the Bar Exam and Practice, 122 W.
VA. L. REV. 107, 117–18 (2019) (“The [Multistate Performance Test], first administered in
1997, was designed to measure an applicant’s ability to use fundamental lawyering skills by
requiring the applicant to complete a task that a new lawyer should be able to perform.”).
53. See, e.g., Applicants v. Tex. State Bd. of L. Exam’rs, No. A 93 CA 740, 1994 WL
923404, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 1994) (“The questions formulated by the Board to seek
information about an applicant’s mental health history have been substantially revised since
1992 in efforts to comply with the [Americans with Disabilities Act].”); Michelina Lucia,
Trial by Surprise: When Character and Fitness Investigations Violate the ADA and Create
Dangerous Lawyers, 38 LAW & INEQ. 205, 222 (2020) (“Along with individuals suing over
allegedly violative questions, the [U.S. Department of Justice] has also brought cases when it
believes a board of law examiners is violating the [Americans with Disabilities Act].”). See
generally Letter from Jocelyn Samuels, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., C.R. Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Just., to Honorable Bernette J. Johnson, Chief Just. of Louisiana Sup. Ct., Elizabeth S. Schell,
Exec. Dir., Louisiana Sup. Ct. Comm. on Bar Admissions & Charles B. Plattsmier, Chief
Disciplinary Couns., Louisiana Att’y Disciplinary Bd. (Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.ada.gov/
louisiana-bar-lof.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GFL-372Q]; Letter from Jocelyn Samuels, Acting
Assistant Att’y Gen., C.R. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Karen L. Richards, Exec. Dir., Vermont
Hum. Rts. Comm’n (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.bazelon.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/
03/2.5.14-DOJ-Letter-on-Bar-Admissions.pdf [https://perma.cc/MHP8-ANQQ].
54. Benjamin H. Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the
Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 431 (2001) (“[T]here
are extensive educational requirements, including three or more years of pre-legal education,
and graduation from an ABA accredited law school. The bar exam and accompanying
character and fitness reviews have also expanded in scope and content.”); id. at 445 n.57 (“The
bar exam also only measures a certain, relatively small, group of attorney skills. Some
students might even argue the skills it measures are memorizing and regurgitating
information.”).

2021]

HOW SHOULD WE LICENSE LAWYERS?

1303

A. The Costs of Entry
The bar exam imposes significant costs. Under the current system,
Professor Deborah Merritt estimates that those costs amount to roughly $750
million a year among first-time takers.55 Current licensing requirements—
especially the bar exam—create a substantial hurdle to entry that
disproportionately burdens the applicants who would most diversify the legal
profession. Preparing for the bar exam is both time-consuming and
expensive. Applicants spend months studying for the exam after they
graduate from law school. Typically, exam preparation requires at least three
months of forgone income as students study the recommended eight to ten
hours a day. The period without earnings may last several months longer, as
graduates often do not receive their scores until late fall, and many employers
will not hire graduates until after they pass the bar, not just take it.56 Exam
fees often cost several hundred dollars, and bar preparation classes, virtually
required in order to pass, cost thousands of dollars.57 Students without family
resources or a large law firm footing the bill must often take out significant
bar study loans on top of the student debt they may already carry from
undergraduate and law school.
For the small population of students who accept positions in large law
firms, and for students from families with substantial financial resources, the
bar exam is a surmountable hurdle. For students without such resources, it
may be insurmountable. Students without substantial family wealth may
simply not be able to spend months without income, yet working while
studying for the bar makes it harder to complete the work necessary to pass.58
Given the racial wealth gap in the United States, these difficulties place a

55. Deborah J. Merritt, Reflections of a Bar Exam Skeptic, LAW SCH. CAFE (May 26,
2017),
https://www.lawschoolcafe.org/2017/05/26/reflections-of-a-bar-exam-skeptic
[https://perma.cc/L7K6-URMS].
56. Id. (“At the median annual salary of $65,000 for new law graduates, those ten weeks
of bar study cost an applicant $12,500 in foregone income.”); see also Julie Merow, Why a
Delayed Bar Exam Is a Financial and Legal Disaster, AM. BAR ASS’N FOR L. STUDENTS:
STUDENT LAW. (Apr. 10, 2020), https://abaforlawstudents.com/2020/04/10/why-a-delayedbar-exam-is-a-financial-and-legal-disaster
[https://perma.cc/7F62-FFRJ]
(“[I]t
is
recommended that test takers study at least 600 hours in order to pass on the first attempt.
This study demand cannot be met if graduates are working full-time while prepping for the
bar.”).
57. Kristin Booth Glen, When and Where We Enter: Rethinking Admission to the Legal
Profession, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1696, 1735 n.144 (2002) (“There is something both sad and
ironic about the fact that law graduates spend three years of their lives, and often amass debt
in excess of $100,000, but are told (generally correctly) that they cannot gain entry to the
profession—that is, pass a bar examination—without taking an expensive postgraduate prep
course that does not teach them how to lawyer but rather how to take the test successfully.”).
58. T. LaBossiere, Working During the Bar Exam?: Start Studying Yesterday, RIPS L.
LIBR. BLOG (Sept. 4, 2018), https://ripslawlibrarian.wordpress.com/2018/09/04/workingduring-the-bar-exam-start-studying-yesterday [https://perma.cc/XJ5J-37ZN] (“[I]f a bar
prepper is working anywhere upwards of 25 hours a week—about 5 hours per day—and
topping off with an additional 8–10 hours of dedicated study, even at the minimum total of 13
hours a day, a prepper will more than likely feel strained and overworked, consequently
minimizing his or her work efficiency and retention when approaching daily bar prep tasks.”).
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disproportionate burden on students from underrepresented minority
groups.59
On top of creating barriers to racial and socioeconomic diversity, the bar
exam also hampers gender diversity. Although adopting the Uniform Bar
Examination has facilitated multistate licensing, licensing is still handled at
the state level and multistate licensing may require taking more than one bar
exam. It is common for women lawyers to take time off from professional
work; 42 percent of women attorneys leave professional life for a period of
time (not counting maternity leave), and the average time away from work is
three years.60 By contrast, only 30 percent of women in business, and 21
percent of women in medicine, take time off and when they do, they take
only an average of two years as opposed to three.61 Approximately a quarter
of women lawyers leave work for six to nine years.62 When lawyers return
to the workforce after taking time away, they often find it difficult to return
to law firms, where the partner track narrows over time and the returning
lawyer does not fit well within the traditional hierarchy.63 Approximately 73
percent of women returning to work report difficulty finding professional
employment.64 Women are also more likely than men to move to a new state
for a spouse’s employment.65 The combination of time away from practice
and likelihood of moving make it challenging for women to reenter the legal
profession, and the licensing requirements in a new state add to that burden.
As a result, many women attorneys return to work outside the law, and even
those who stay in the legal profession find that burdensome licensure
requirements delay their career progress.66

59. See generally MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE
RACIAL WEALTH GAP (2017).
60. Ellen Rosen, Finding a Way back to the Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/26/business/finding-a-way-back-to-the-law.html
[https://perma.cc/4D9W-LJKS].
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. About the OnRamp Fellowship:
The Problem, ONRAMP FELLOWSHIP,
http://onrampfellowship.com/about [https://perma.cc/K5LA-RK35] (last visited Jan. 27,
2021) (“Since organizations usually hire and advance experienced professionals based on
seniority and tenure, it’s difficult for a returning lawyer and her potential employer to know
where she fits into the traditional structure upon re-entry. And, in most law firms, it is virtually
impossible for an experienced lawyer to re-engineer her practice because of the rigid billable
rate structure that is typically tied to years of experience.”).
64. Id.
65. Dina ElBoghdady, Why Couples Move for a Man’s Job, but Not a Woman’s, WASH.
POST (Nov. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/11/28/whycouples-move-for-a-mans-job-but-not-a-womans [https://perma.cc/8SS8-CMU9].
66. See Hilary Moore, I Am a Woman Who Left the Law, ABA J. (Oct. 2, 2018, 6:02 AM
CDT),
https://www.abajournal.com/voice/article/I_am_a_woman_who_left_the_law
[https://perma.cc/X2HR-ZCJX] (“Thanks to licensure barriers, my career advanced
sluggishly, delayed by short-notice moves, studying for exams, waiting for results and finding
new employment time after time.”).
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B. Preparation for Practice?
What do the states get for that $750 million? Certainly not an accurate
picture of whether applicants are prepared for practice. From the time that
bar exams began, courts recognized that success on the exam did not always
equate to true preparation for practice. In 1924, the Chicago Bar Association
even brought an action to disbar attorney Lewis Baker, who ran a ten-week
session of “quiz classes” intended to help law school graduates “cram” for
the bar exam.67 The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately held that Lewis’s
conduct was not unprofessional enough to warrant taking away his license to
practice, but the court did express concern that the “cramming” led to a
higher pass rate based on “purely a feat of memory.”68 The court found that
Lewis’s work “result[ed] in his students passing the examinations without
regard to the question whether they are or are not fitted by experience,
training, and study to be admitted to the bar, and largely on the applicant’s
ability temporarily to memorize, verbatim, questions and answers given him
by the respondent” and concluded that “[t]his results in a lowering of the
standard of admission to the bar.”69 Although he escaped formal discipline,
the court appeared to view the problem as one created by Lewis’s efforts
rather than an inherent problem with the bar exam itself.
The criticism that the bar relies heavily on memorization rather than true
preparation for practice is even stronger today. A modern lawyer would be
much better served by developing skills to sort through and prioritize the
ever-present deluge of information at our fingertips, rather than memorizing
the elements of negotiability for a check or the common-law definition of
burglary. As Professor Merritt has noted, the exam “ignores entirely”
important skills, such as “interviewing, fact gathering, counseling, and
negotiating” or electronic legal research.70
The subjects most often tested on the bar exam also rely on an outdated
conception of legal practice. Perhaps a general practitioner of the last century
may have needed a thorough grounding in torts, contracts, criminal law, and
commercial law. But most practice today is far more specialized. Professor
David Wilkins has pointed out that a uniform regulatory structure fails to
meet modern needs, as it assumes “that a single enforcement structure will
be appropriate for all lawyers in all contexts.”71 In fact, “[t]his unitary
vision . . . fails to account for the diversity in both the structure of the legal
marketplace and society’s expectations of the profession.”72 In a world of
limited resources, trying to impose a unified regulatory structure on “all
lawyers in all contexts” creates massive inefficiencies by imposing
67. People ex rel. Chi. Bar Ass’n v. Baker, 142 N.E. 554 (Ill. 1924).
68. Id. at 557–58.
69. Id. at 558.
70. Id.; Merritt, supra note 55. The NCBE has announced plans to include some of these
skills in a new version of the Uniform Bar Examination that is currently under development.
See Jain, supra note 13.
71. David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 887
(1992).
72. Id.
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regulatory burdens in some contexts without offsetting benefits and
simultaneously, leaving insufficient resources to offer meaningful client
protection in other contexts.73
Bar examiners have recognized some of these limitations. Joseph R. Julin,
previously the director of testing, research, and development for the NCBE,
explained in 1987 that the modern bar exam attempts to test for “minimum
competence,” which roughly translates into the ability to gain competence
through practice, rather than existing readiness for practice:
When I talk about competency that we are seeking to identify, I don’t think
it is competency that is practiced on a given day. I think the competency
we are talking about is seeking to identify whether the individual who is
being subjected to the measurement process has the educational foundation
which will enable that individual to become competent to handle matters
committed to him or her or the ability to recognize that developing required
competence would necessarily be at a prohibitive cost or beyond an
individual’s ability.74

Today, the NCBE describes the goal of the bar exam in a similar way, stating
that it “has confidence that the current exam is a valid measure of minimum
competence for entry-level practice.”75 The bar exam aspires to measure
only “competence to begin practice,” not readiness to represent clients in
particular legal matters.76
C. Public Protection
The bar exam is an extraordinarily expensive way to measure whether
graduates possess the ability to become competent to practice. Would
abandoning the exam create a risk to the public? Of the thirty-four states that
historically allowed for diploma privilege, Wisconsin is the only one that has
continued to do so—and no flood of unqualified attorneys has taken over that
state.77 Wisconsin’s law schools are also relatively well regarded and the
state requires a core curriculum.78
Over a century ago, the Illinois Supreme Court justified a bar exam
requirement by pointing to the growth of new law schools, stating that
without the bar exam there would be “only a step from the diploma mill to
the bar.”79 The NCBE echoed this position in 2020, arguing that a bar exam
is necessary to protect against the admission of individuals unqualified to
practice law because there has been a “decline in the credentials” of students
73. See id. (“[T]he question to be asked is not who should regulate lawyers, but rather
how should policymakers coordinate the various resources at their disposal to increase the
likelihood that all segments of society can benefit from a competent and independent legal
profession.”).
74. Jeffrey M. Duban, The Bar Exam as a Test of Competence: The Idea Whose Time
Never Came, N.Y. ST. BAR J., July/Aug. 1991, at 34, 38.
75. NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAM’RS, supra note 51, at 6.
76. Id. at 4.
77. Marsha Griggs, Building a Better Bar Exam, 7 TEX. A&M L. REV. 1, 64–65 (2019).
78. Id.
79. In re Day, 54 N.E. 646, 653 (Ill. 1899).
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admitted to law schools in recent years and schools are “student-centric”
institutions that want to see “all their graduates authorized to practice law.”80
Assuming that this is true, is it necessarily a problem?
Professors Robert Anderson and Derek Muller conducted an extensive
review of the data on bar exam passage and later disciplinary actions.81 Their
research showed that there is a small but significant correlation between
lower bar exam scores and later rates of disciplinary action.82 At the same
time, however, their findings revealed low overall rates of discipline, so that
even a higher rate of discipline among some still corresponded to a low
absolute number of cases.83 And, as they point out and as other scholars have
suggested, there can be confounding variables, such as practice setting, that
better predict later discipline.84 But their study revealed one very intriguing
fact: “[t]here is virtually no discipline in the first ten years of practice.”85
Why are attorneys almost never disciplined in their first decade of
practice? It is not because they are more knowledgeable than more
experienced attorneys, and there is no reason to think they are more ethical.
It is much more likely that practice setting is driving this impact: entry-level
attorneys are unlikely to be practicing in settings where they have primary
responsibility to vulnerable clients.86
This explanation fits with an understanding of agency theory, which posits
that professional regulation is intended to substitute for the principal’s
monitoring of its agent when the principal lacks the specialized knowledge
necessary to effectively evaluate the agent’s work.87 Occupational licensing
can provide a level of trust that is “especially necessary where consumers are
vulnerable because of asymmetries in information, capacity, or power, or if
failure to competently provide a service can have particularly dire
consequences.”88
In modern law practice, not all clients are created equal. Some clients,
such as government agencies and multinational corporations, are highly
capable of looking out for their own legal interests and thus do not need to
rely on government licensing to tell them whether an attorney is sufficiently
80. NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAM’RS, supra note 51, at 7.
81. See generally Anderson & Muller, supra note 49.
82. Id. at 310 (“We find support for the assertion that attorneys with lower bar exam
performance are more likely to be disciplined and disbarred than those with higher
performance.”).
83. Id. at 312–13.
84. See generally William Wesley Patton, A Rebuttal to Kinsler’s and to Anderson and
Muller’s Studies on the Purported Relationship Between Bar Passage Rates and Attorney
Discipline, 93 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 43 (2019); Deborah J. Merritt, Bar Exam Scores and Lawyer
Discipline, LAW SCH. CAFE (June 3, 2017), https://www.lawschoolcafe.org/2017/06/03/barexam-scores-and-lawyer-discipline [https://perma.cc/WG8K-7MBG].
85. Anderson & Muller, supra note 49, at 313.
86. See Merritt, supra note 84 (noting that “[l]awyers in solo practice and small firms
receive over 90% of disciplinary sanctions”).
87. See Barton, supra note 54, at 465–66; Cassandra Burke Robertson, A Collaborative
Model of Offshore Legal Outsourcing, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 125, 144 (2011).
88. Nick Robinson, The Multiple Justifications of Occupational Licensing, 93 WASH. L.
REV. 1903, 1936 (2018).
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qualified.89 In fact, some research suggests that such organizational clients
are better at monitoring lawyers’ conduct than licensing entities.90 Corporate
clients effectively monitor external law firms, and law firms likewise
“develop internal controls to curb misconduct that stems from individuallawyer opportunism.”91
On the other hand, more vulnerable clients include individuals facing lifechanging legal events: people going through divorce or custody proceedings,
people facing criminal charges, and people in need of immigration assistance.
These clients are least able to monitor for attorney quality, they interact with
the legal system only rarely—usually when they are facing a serious
problem—and need an attorney precisely because they “do not possess
sufficient information to make an informed decision about their respective
legal rights or the extent of their obligations.”92 These clients are more likely
to rely on professional licensing as an indication of competence.93
When it comes to attorneys in their first decade of practice, however, these
vulnerable clients are be unable to rely on passage of a bar exam as an
indication of practice readiness. After all, the bar exam does not even try to
evaluate such readiness. Regardless, the low rates of discipline for attorneys
in these years suggests that it may not matter.94 This low discipline rate
indicates that more senior attorneys, either in law firms or in other
organizational settings, play a much more significant role in evaluating junior
attorneys’ practice readiness. Less than 2 percent of newly licensed lawyers
go into solo practice, so the vast majority of newly licensed lawyers will have
an employer supervising and evaluating their work.95 Indeed, a much higher
fraction of new graduates—close to 18 percent—seek employment outside
the law, either in “J.D. Advantage” positions or in other professional
89. See Dana Remus, Hemispheres Apart: A Profession Connected, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
2665, 2681 (2014) (noting the need “to increase competency and access in the personalservices hemisphere and independence in the corporate hemisphere”); David B. Wilkins, Team
of Rivals?: Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2067, 2075 (2010) (explaining that elite lawyers tend to be more deferential to their
clients); Fred C. Zacharias, Effects of Reputation on the Legal Profession, 65 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 173, 190 (2008) (describing how “corporate and other sophisticated clients,” especially
those with in-house counsel, will be able to ask the questions that help them accurately identify
lawyers with reputations for the specific characteristics they desire).
90. Christopher J. Whelan & Neta Ziv, Privatizing Professionalism: Client Control of
Lawyers’ Ethics, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577, 2604 (2012) (“External regulators cannot
effectively monitor the behavior of individual lawyers or law firms, but corporate clients can.
Not only can clients, especially in-house counsel, monitor lawyer conduct directly and
indirectly, they have the leverage to direct and to manage particular behavior.”).
91. Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. & Ted Schneyer, Regulatory Controls on Large Law Firms:
A Comparative Perspective, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 593, 608 (2002).
92. Lisa H. Nicholson, Access to Justice Requires Access to Attorneys: Restrictions on
the Practice of Law Serve a Societal Purpose, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2761, 2769 (2014).
93. See id. (arguing that regulation is needed to protect this sector because “a free-market
system for legal services would provide these consumers a false sense of security”).
94. See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text.
95. James G. Leipold & Judith N. Collins, The Entry-Level Employment Market for New
Law School Graduates 10 Years After the Great Recession, BAR EXAM’R, Winter 2017–18, at
8, 10–16.
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settings.96 To the extent that clients need protection from incompetent or
unprepared lawyers, the bar exam’s evaluation of “entry-level competence”
is unlikely to be of much help.97
III. REFRAMING THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN LAWYER LICENSING
Current state licensing practices impose a cost on both states and
applicants that is disproportionate to any public protection offered by the
exam. What would a licensing regime designed for client protection look
like? This Article proposes a more narrowly targeted role for judicial
evaluation of attorney competence that has two parts. First, the judiciary
should cease trying to evaluate entry-level competence into the profession,
as it creates little, if any, public benefit but imposes a heavy burden on new
entrants. Second, the judiciary should take a more active role in evaluating
attorney competence in areas where clients are most vulnerable: court
proceedings involving individual litigants and management of client funds.
A. Diploma Privilege with Limited Practice
As an entry-level hurdle, the bar exam should go. States should return to
recognizing diploma privilege but with limitations. Specifically, the bar
exam’s test of entry-level minimum competence is not needed when
employers can do a better job of monitoring, evaluating, and developing new
lawyers’ skills. Very few new graduates go immediately into solo practice
and with good reason: competence is a progression, and students are rarely
prepared to take on the role of lead counsel right after law school. But for
the vast majority of graduates who go work for law firms, for the government,
or go in-house in corporations, the bar exam offers little value. When
students work in government agencies or as in-house counsel in corporations,
their clients are also their employers—and their employers can assess both
their own legal needs and the abilities of their employees.98 In law firms, the
situation may be different—the lawyer in those firms may be offering
representation to clients less able to effectively make these judgments. Even
in such a setting, however, the possibility of vicarious liability for a junior
attorney’s errors will create an incentive for firms to supervise the attorney’s
work and to ensure that the attorney is not asked to take on more than the
attorney can handle.99

96. Id.
97. See Debra Moss Curtis, “They’re Digging in the Wrong Place”: How Learning
Outcomes Can Improve Bar Exams and Ensure Practice Ready Attorneys, 10 ELON L. REV.
239, 250 (2018) (“[A]nyone who has studied for this exam knows two truths: (1) much of the
knowledge doesn’t stay with people after the exam, and (2) even if it does, the law changes
and lawyers must constantly keep up with it (a skill not measured on the exam itself).”).
98. See supra Part II.
99. Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L.
REV. 1707, 1727 (1998) (“A public interest rationale for some form of mandatory vicarious
liability is that it increases monitoring beyond what lawyers otherwise would do in the absence
of a mandatory rule.”).
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A limited diploma privilege would allow for supervised practice, whether
in a law firm, government agency, corporation, or other supervised setting.
This would lessen the burden on new graduates and on lawyers moving to a
new state by allowing them to pursue employment opportunities without the
expense and delay occasioned by the bar exam. Judicial evaluation of
competence would wait until later in their career—when the risk to
vulnerable clients is higher.
It would be impossible to rank each and every potential client on a
vulnerability index. But it is possible—and indeed, not terribly difficult—to
identify certain contexts within the practice of law that increase the likelihood
of client vulnerability. The first would be courtroom appearances—that is,
representing clients in criminal proceedings, civil litigation, probate, or other
matters. The second would be transactional practice outside the courtroom
that requires a lawyer to handle client funds, including accepting settlements
on behalf of a client, accepting payment for legal services, or serving as an
escrow officer in a real estate transaction. Lawyers in these two contexts—
those who make court appearances or who handle client funds—have
significant power to shape their clients’ success or failure.
There is no significant public benefit, however, in licensing lawyers who
neither practice in court nor handle client funds. These lawyers may practice
in-house in a corporation or other organization. They may work in a state
agency. They may even work in a law firm. In large law firms, for example,
junior attorneys rarely appear in court and almost never handle client funds.
But these practice settings share one common feature: in each case, the
attorney has an employer supervising the attorney’s practice. This employer
will likely be far more able to assess the lawyer’s competence and oversee
the quality of the lawyer’s work than would any bar examiner or licensing
entity.
Allowing diploma privilege for attorneys who practice in organizations
and do not appear in court or handle client funds frees up significant
resources. It also opens significant employment opportunities to law school
graduates without the cost and delay that comes from taking the bar, and it
likewise frees the states from expending the time and money required to
assess the competence of these graduates. Diploma privilege should be an
easy call for attorneys who practice in these low-risk settings.100
B. More Active Judicial Evaluation of Competence When Clients Are More
Vulnerable
If the states no longer needed to manage a $750 million testing program to
establish entry-level competence, then significant resources would be freed
up to establish new means of evaluating attorneys in settings where
monitoring attorney competence is difficult. By more narrowly targeting
100. Ilya Somin, The Case for Replacing the Bar Exam with “Diploma Privilege,”
REASON: THE VOLOKH CONSPRIRACY (July 29, 2020, 3:47 PM), https://reason.com/
2020/07/29/the-case-for-replacing-the-bar-exam-with-diploma-privilege [https://perma.cc/
MS5F-REFS].
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judicial attention and state resources, such evaluations could move beyond
traditional written tests and encompass practice-based evaluations and
judicial observation.101 Such an undertaking would be infeasible if applied
to the profession as a whole.102 But if contextualized within different
practices and deployed carefully in targeted areas of client vulnerability, such
specialized testing could offer significant client protection. Such a practice
could also build on existing resources. In eighteen states, the infrastructure
to certify lawyers as specialists in practice areas such as criminal law, family
law, and appellate law already exists.103 Private organizations also engage
in specialized certification, and some administrative entities do so as well.104
What are the points of client vulnerability where such evaluation would
offer the most benefit? Sociologists of legal practice have long categorized
law practice in two hemispheres: one that represents individuals and one that
represents organizations.105 In recent years, Professor Bill Henderson
showed that the “PeopleLaw sector” has shrunk to significantly less than a
third of the total dollars spent on lawyers in the United States.106 Practice
areas in the “PeopleLaw” sphere include “personal injury, family law,
criminal defense and trusts-and-estates work.”107
Evaluating competence in the PeopleLaw sector offers a much better fit
for judicial expertise. The judiciary’s broad grip on lawyer licensing has
always been tenuous, especially when the judiciary controlled entry
requirements for lawyers who never set foot in a courtroom or engaged in
litigation-related practice; such regulation fits better within the legislature’s
police power.108 But judges are very well equipped to determine whether
lawyers practicing in their courtrooms have shown competence to engage in
a particular component of legal practice. What would a lawyer need to
demonstrate in order to show readiness to litigate a divorce case? To defend
101. For one discussion of what the mechanics of later-career certification might look like,
see Bruce A. Green, The Flood of U.S. Lawyers: Natural Fluctuation or Professional Climate
Change?, 19 INT’L J. LEGAL PRO. 193, 201–03 (2012).
102. Id. at 203.
103. See Sources of Certification, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/standing-committee-onspecialization/resources/resources_for_lawyers/sources_of_certification [https://perma.cc/
PQ7C-TWQ2] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
104. See Barbara Allison Clayton, Comment, Are We Our Brother’s Keepers?: A
Discussion of Nonlawyer Representation Before Texas Administrative Agencies and
Recommendations for the Future, 8 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 115, 138 (2007) (“[F]ederal
agencies, namely the Patent Commission and Interstate Commerce Commission, have had
success with requiring nonlawyers who wish to practice administrative law take exams and
become certified.”).
105. JACK P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE
OF THE BAR 319 (1982).
106. WILLIAM D. HENDERSON, LEGAL MARKET LANDSCAPE REPORT 13 (2018), reprinted in
Memorandum from Randall Difuntorum, Program Manager, Pro. Competence, State
Bar of Cal., to Members, Bd. of Trs., State Bar of Cal. (July 19, 2018),
https://taxprof.typepad.com/files/henderson.pdf [https://perma.cc/MA2M-N7W2].
107. Id. at 12.
108. See Lee, supra note 16, at 241–42 (discussing the basis of legislative and judicial
authority to regulate admission to practice a profession).
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a criminal proceeding? To charge a retainer and handle client fees? Judges
are in a good position both to create the procedures to measure such
specialized competencies and to evaluate them.
Limiting the competency evaluation just to courtroom practice would
probably not go far enough, as it leaves out significant nonlitigation practices,
even in the PeopleLaw sector: the creation of wills and trusts, debt
settlement, and the negotiation of legal disputes outside a courtroom. What
all of these nonlitigation matters have in common, however, is the handling
of client funds—both in taking payment from the client and in receiving
funds in a legal settlement on the client’s behalf or as part of a probate
arrangement. This is an area of significant client vulnerability and frequent
discipline. Violations of trust fund rules, including both commingling of
funds and the misappropriation of funds held in trust, “account for about
fourteen percent of all disbarments and about eight percent of all suspensions
nationally.”109 In at least one state, trust fund improprieties led to more than
half of all disciplinary violations over the course of several decades.110
Handling of client funds should be treated as a practice area of its own.
Attorneys could and should be tested specifically on the rules for handling
client funds before they are authorized to set up client trust accounts, and
states should continue to engage in audits of client trust accounts, both on
notification of overdrafts and at both periodic and random intervals.111
Thus, in place of the current cumbersome and ineffective bar exam, the
judicial branch could instead engage in more targeted evaluation later in an
attorney’s career that focuses on the areas where clients are especially
vulnerable. Offering such specialized evaluation would better protect clients
by aligning much more closely the skills tested to actual practice. It may also
build on judicial experience and the desire to improve courtroom practice.
Finally, it would also provide a more stable on-ramp into the profession, as
lawyers would no longer need to devote three months to climbing a single
large ladder in order to enter the legal profession. Instead, lawyers could gain
experience in supervised practice and prove their competence for a lead
counsel (or solo counsel) role when they are ready. Although entry-level
attorneys rarely go into solo practice, it is even possible that the requisite
supervised practice and demonstration of competence could be established
through law school clinics. For lawyers who want to change career directions
later, legal aid clinics might offer supervised practice opportunities to those
who have graduated. The PeopleLaw sector, after all, contains far more
people who need legal representation than people who can afford to pay for
it. Law schools, the judiciary, and legal aid agencies would all have an
interest in working together to promote competent and effective
109. Philip F. Downey, Attorneys’ Trust Accounts: The Bar’s Role in the Preservation of
Client Property, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 275, 276 (1988).
110. David E. Johnson, Lawyer, Thou Shall Not Steal, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 454, 456 (1984)
(“Since 1948, 53% of all final public discipline meted out to attorneys by the Supreme Court
of New Jersey has involved lawyers who have stolen or engaged in other financial
improprieties.” (footnote omitted)).
111. Cf. id. at 534 (arguing that periodic audits would improve detection of irregularities).
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representation that goes beyond the “entry level minimum competence” the
bar examiners currently work so hard to measure.
CONCLUSION
There is a new momentum and willingness to think about major changes
in the regulatory structure of the legal profession. Arizona and Utah are
experimenting with opening the practice of law to outside investment in an
effort to expand the number of people able to afford legal services.112 The
COVID-19 pandemic has encouraged states to consider new methods of
licensing on an emergency basis—and some have expressed a willingness to
consider more permanent changes.113 We should build on this momentum to
abandon the parts of the lawyer licensing system that create burdens far
outweighing any protection they might offer the public. Focusing on the
practice areas where public protection is most needed creates space for a
more specialized licensure system that goes beyond minimum competence.

112. Arthur J. Lachman & Jan L. Jacobowitz, Arizona and Utah Jumpstart Legal
Regulatory Reform, LAW PRAC. TODAY (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.lawpracticetoday.org
article/arizona-utah-jumpstart-legal-regulatory-reform [https://perma.cc/K9WT-MURX].
113. Letter from J. Brett Busby, Liaison to the Bd. of L. Exam’rs, to Tex. L. Sch. Deans 1
(Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1449651/deans_letter_082820.pdf
[https://perma.cc/25SW-HKYR] (“The Court also remains interested in considering
alternative paths to licensure, both as necessary in response to the pandemic and in the long
term. In fact, the Court began a partnership with the ABA Commission on the Future of Legal
Education late last year to explore possible alternatives.”).

